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Abstract
Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health
care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and
the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to
provide preventive health care.
We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change
from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation
of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done.
We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from pri-
mary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to
most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the
issue of preventive health care.
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1 Introduction.
Prevention is one of the points of attention of the recent policy orientation in health
care to maintain the objectives of equity, efficiency, and quality in face of the in-
creasing budgetary difficulties to finance universal health care systems.
The WHO (1986), in the letter of Ottawa to promote health over all the popu-
lation, proposed three courses of action: (i) development of healthy habits among
children and youngsters, (ii) education in the self-care as well as encouragement of
groups of mutual help, and (iii) application of preventive activities to the popula-
tion in general and to the high-risk groups in particular.
There are several notions of prevention. Kenkel (2000) distinguishes three cat-
egories of prevention. Primary prevention relates to activities reducing the occur-
rence or incidence of disease. Secondary prevention considers “actions that reduce
or eliminate the health consequences of a disease given its occurrence” (p. 1677).
Finally, tertiary prevention comprises activities aiming at reducing the disabilities
associated with chronic illness.
The American Board of Preventive Medicine, as quoted by Dranove (1998),
proposes a global definition of preventive medicine as “that speciality of medical
practice which focusses on the health of individuals and defined populations in
order to protect, promote, and maintain health and well-being and prevent disease,
disability and premature death.”
In a somewhat more individualistic fashion, Oliver and Berger (1979), quoting
Kasl and Cobb (1996), define preventive health care behavior as “any activity un-
dertaken by a person who believes himself to be healthy for the purpose of prevent-
ing disease in an asymptomatic stage.” In this context, Duraisamy and Duraisamy
(1995) study the allocation of resources within the family unit according to the sex
of the children in a rural community in India. From the perspective of the firm,
Boxx and Chambless (1975) examine the benefits (cost savings) that an organiza-
tion may obtain with a proper behavior scheme and regular medical check-ups to
the employees, from the top executives until the workers in the simplest tasks.
Our focus differs from the above. We are interested in the industrial organi-
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zation of the health care market and the role of prevention. According to Kenkel
(2000, pp. 1684-1685) “The field of health economics has not developed explicit
models of the supply of prevention. In part this is because there is not an identifi-
able industry that produces prevention, viewed broadly; (...) Separate analysis of
the supply of preventive medical care could be more fruitful, depending upon the
extent to which this supply differs in important ways from the supply of physician
services more generally. (...) A complete understanding of the supply of preventive
medical care would require analysis of the structure of the physician services mar-
kets and the health insurance market, recognizing the multiple agency relationships
between the physician, consumer, and third party payer.”
Closer to this spirit is Encinosa and Sappington (1997). These authors present
a model of competition among HMOs where the level of provision of preventive
health services is used as an instrument to induce individuals to declare their true
health state. However, the model was not intended for analysis of other aspects
that are of relevance, like integration, or not, of primary and acute care within the
same provider or the definition of a bundled payment (joint for both providers). In
a recent paper, Banks, Parker and Wendel (2001) look at the strategic interaction
among providers of acute care and of nursing facilities, and how payment systems
interact with incentives for vertical integration. They also address the normative
question of whether the first-best can be achieved. Though with a different aim,
our main questions are close to theirs.
A general problem health authorities face is to provide the proper incentives
both to patients to be willing to accept the increase in premia associated to the
widening with preventive services of their insurance contracts, and to the insur-
ance companies so that they are willing to include preventive care services in their
insurance contracts (see, for instance, Kenkel (2000 pp. 1685-1693) and Zweifel
and Breyer (1997, ch. 6). This is an important issue because the traditional anal-
yses on provision of preventive health care services foresee an insufficient level of
investment even though the total benefits of the provision of these services exceed
their costs. In this sense Barigozzi (2001) reports on the lack of general agree-
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ment in the cost-containment value of measures of secondary prevention such as
diagnostic screening that usually do not do well in the cost-benefit analyses. The
reason behind is that these analyses do not consider simultaneously the two sources
of demand of preventive health services. On the one hand, patients lose income and
utility when falling sick. On the other hand, insurance companies bear the costs
associated to the appearance of the sickness (hospital, medicines, visits to doctors,
etc.). Without the adequate incentives, neither the patients nor the private insurers
are willing to pay for services of preventive medicine. A first effort in considering
these effects together is Helwege (1996).
In this paper, we address the effects of providing preventive health services ac-
cording to whether this provision is centralized or decentralized among first and
second level providers. The WHO in its World Health Report 2000, devotes part
of chapter 3 to the description of service delivery configurations, and to the in-
centives according to the organizations structure of service provision. We rather
investigate the structure of the relationships between primary and secondary care
providers in relation with the activities (what in the model we refer to as efforts)
linked to prevention. These relationships have been studied in different contexts.
We can group them in four (broad) categories: (i) the synergies between hospital
and primary care center (see Chatziarsenis et al. (1998)). Especially interesting is
a recent experience in Portugal where the management of a stated-owned hospital
was concessioned to private management. An evaluation, conducted for the Re-
gional Health Authority, comparing the privately managed hospital with a similar
size NHS hospital, suggested that links between primary care centers and hospitals
were, in both cases, below the desired level (INA (1999)). The private manage-
ment has stated several times their willingness to manage the primary care centers
in the geographical area of influence. This desire is so far unmet (see also Hospital
Sa˜o Sebastia˜o (2000)). Instead, another recent experiment in the Portuguese health
system was the creation of local health systems, which put under the same manage-
ment hospitals and primary care centers within a small, well-defined geographical
area; (ii) the substitution between primary care and emergency departments in re-
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lation with the provision of preventive care (see Hull et al. (2000), O’Brien et
al. (1999), and Robertson-Steel (1998)). The basic objective of these studies is to
identify the difficulties patients encounter in accessing the primary care services.
By correcting them, the possibility arises of referring emergency department users
to primary care; (iii) primary care clinicians as providers both of primary care
and preventive services (see Keim et al. (1999) and Rafferty (1998)). Here, we
find attempts to estimate the proportion of time primary care physician spend on
prevention during routine care of patients; (iv) on referral rates, hospital admis-
sions and quality of primary care (see Coulter (1998), Giuffrida et al. (1999), and
Jankowski (1999)).
The question of centralization vs. decentralization of the provision of services
is also relevant in relation with the managed care literature. Glied (2000) proposes
a “broad definition” of managed care including (i) fully integrated insurance and
service delivery; (ii) insured people restricted to a defined set of providers; and
(iii) unrestricted choice of providers with insurers providing incentives to select
providers. In this sense, managed care provides further instruments as the selection
and organization of providers, the methods used to pay providers, and the methods
of utilization review. It is also known that different levels of provider integration
originates distinct preventive levels (Weiner and de Lissovoy (1993)). Other jus-
tifications have been proposed. Back to Pauly (1970) we find a positive relation
between financial means and prevention effort. Frank, Glazer and McGuire (2000)
relate the prevention effort with the attraction of healthier than average population.
To these arguments we add the internalization of the referral decisions.
Curiously enough, the early HMOs were, on average, more vertically inte-
grated than the present ones. An interpretation provided by Glied (2000, p. 713)
is that “the advantages of formal vertical integration have declined over time or
that consumer preferences for choice have increased”. In any case, the integration
aspect remained true whether in one-to-one relations or in group relations. In-
dependent practice associations seem to dominate, namely the preferred provider
organizations.
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The payment rules vary according to the service and according to the risk bur-
den imposed upon the provider (see Mossialos and Le Grand (1999) for a review
of systems in place in the European Union countries). For example, capitation pay-
ments defined for a narrow scope of services are usually coupled with additional
mechanisms to restrict unnecessary, burden-shift referrals. This is very much in
line with our results. In particular, the optimality of vertical integration can be
replicated by an appropriate transfer contract in a non-integrated structure. In
fully vertically integrated plans, physicians are paid by salary; under decentral-
ization, groups of physicians are paid on a capitation basis. Within the group, both
capitation and salaries can exist; the individual physician contracts use capitation,
discounted fee-for-service or incentive schemes. There are also less integrated ar-
rangements, such as discounted fee-for-service that can be combined with bonuses
or other incentive mechanisms.
The substitution of primary care for more expensive hospital services has been
present in a number of cost strategies, as well as the use of payment incentives
to treat patients in primary care. Barigozzi (2001) studies optimal reimbursement
for secondary prevention and treatment when insurance uses a linear mechanism
and treatment and prevention may be either substitute or complementary goods. In
this regard the WHO (1998) supports the idea of mixed payment systems, with a
significant prospective component. Nonetheless, there is the worry of prospective
payments leading to excessive referrals. We address the question explicitly in this
paper.
Glied (2000) discusses four sources of market failure and how management
care arrangements cope with them: (i) asymmetric information about health risks:
managed care plans are able to better segment consumers according to risk and uti-
lization preferences; (ii) moral hazard: managed care adds supply-side cost shar-
ing to the demand-side cost sharing typical of insurance contracts; (iii) information
about health care quality: managed care plans may perform the role of providing
information to consumers about the quality of care due to the way managed care
is organized and its information requirements; (iv) industry competitiveness: man-
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aged care plans may be a way to overcome the lack of competition in some areas
and to countervail the market power of providers of health care. We add a fifth
element. This is referral externalities. As our model shows, either a centralized
structure or a decentralized one, combined with an appropriate payment system,
can achieve the same outcome. This outcome is superior to a decentralized struc-
ture with simple payment rules (fee-for-service). Thus, the referral externalities
argument can be a potential explanation for the growth of both types of managed
care vis-a-vis the decline of traditional insurance agreements.1
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model and
introduces the behavioral assumptions on the players. Section 3 is devoted to the
analysis of the equilibrium. Here we introduce two different types of management
(independent or joint) for the primary care center and the hospital. Then we com-
pare the equilibrium effort levels between these two scenarios. This is done through
a series of examples where the payment rule for both the primary care center and
the hospital is fixed and the efficient (net-revenue maximizing) efforts are obtained.
Our analysis of integration is limited. Most of the literature on vertical integration
considers more than two firms. Accordingly, there is room for strategic effects
such as dumping of patients among hospitals (see e.g. Ellis and Ruhm (1988)). We
abstract from these effects to stress the relevance of the externality produced by the
referral of patients from the primary care center to the hospital. Section 4 derives
the optimal (welfare maximizing) payment schemes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model.
Consider a population of N individuals contracting a health insurance providing
preventive care services. Such services can be obtained from first or second level
providers whose managements can be independent or joint. When an individual
gets sick suffers a utility loss L. While healthy enjoys a utility level B.
At the primary care center two activities take place: (i) The primary care cen-
1The qualification “potential” is due to the absence of a formal empirical test of this effect, which
is beyond the scope of the paper.
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ter puts effort e1 to promote prevention. We can think of this effort as activities
population-oriented such as vaccination campaigns and clinician-oriented such as
the use of disposable injections. These actions are oriented to have an impact on the
probability of an individual falling sick, p(e1). The cost of such effort is φ1(e1);
(ii) Patients are visited. Let c denote the cost of visiting a patient at the primary
care center, irrespective of whether (s)he is treated there or referred to the hospital.
Let e2 be the effort done by the primary care center to avoid referring a patient to
the hospital. This effort can thus be interpreted also as the effort of the primary
care center to treat patients. Activities related to this effort e2 can be information
campaigns addressed to the population encouraging the use of the primary care
center rather than the specialized care services or the emergency units of hospitals
to avoid e.g. congestion and limit waiting lists. Also lobbying activities to the
health authority to set the primary care center as gatekeepers or to have facilities
installed such as X-ray machines or minor surgery premises allowing for treatment
of easy patients in the primary care center fall in this category. The cost of the
treatment is cp. The cost of the effort is φ2(e2). Finally, we denote by W (e1, e2)
the revenues to the primary care center, by θ(e2) the probability that a sick person
is treated at the primary care center, and by 1− θ(e2) the probability of referral to
the hospital.
The hospital only action consists in doing some effort to lower treatment costs.
Let e3 denote such effort, and φ3(e3) its cost. One can discuss about the contri-
bution of the hospital to improve referral patterns. In particular, it is sometimes
argued that hospitals have a relatively minor role in influencing referral rates from
primare care centers. We stylize this role by neglecting it. The cost of treating a pa-
tient at the hospital is ch(e3). Finally the revenues to the hospital are R(e1, e2, e3).
We can include another effort on the part of the hospital consisting in actions
to avoid referrals from the primary care center. These actions would complement
those embebded in e2 but would not add any particular insight to the analysis.
We assume c < cp < ch; we also assume that all functions are twice con-
tinuously differentiable and usual regularity properties of the different functions
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hold: convexity of illness probability function, of hospital-treatment cost-reduction
function and of cost of effort; concavity of payment functions, and of the referral
function; zero efforts implies absence of effort costs, no hospital-cost reductions
and strictly positive probabilities of referral and referral rates. Summarizing,
p′(e1) < 0, p
′′
(e1) > 0;
c
′
h(e3) < 0, c
′
h(0) = 0, c
′′
h(e3) > 0;
φ
′
i(ei) > 0, φ
′
i(0) = 0, φ
′′
i (ei) > 0, i = 1, 2, 3;
R3(e3, ·) < 0, Rii(ei, ·) < 0, i = 2, 3, R2(e2, ·) > 0;
W i(ei, ·) < 0, W ii(ei, ·) < 0, i = 1, 2;
θ
′
(e2) > 0, θ
′′
(e2) < 0.
where superindices denote partial derivatives with respect to the specified argu-
ment, e.g. Ri(ei, ·) ≡ ∂R(ei, ·)
∂ei
. In a similar fashion p′(e1) ≡ dp(e1)
de1
or c
′′
h(e3) ≡
d2ch(e3)
de23
.
2.1 Objective functions.
We can certainly discuss extensively the appropriate objective functions for pri-
mary care centers and hospitals. We take here the (narrow) view that they want to
generate the higher possible surplus. We do not specify which use is given to such
surplus.
The primary care center chooses effort levels e1 and e2 to maximize its net
revenues, that is,
ΠP = max
e1,e2
W (e1, e2)− φ1(e1)− φ2(e2)−Np(e1)[cpθ(e2) + c]. (1)
The problem of the hospital is to select effort level e3 to maximize its net revenues.
Formally,
ΠH = max
e3
R(e1, e2, e3)− φ3(e3)−Np(e1)ch(e3)[1− θ(e2)]. (2)
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The health authority chooses effort levels e1, e2, e3 to maximize social welfare:
max
e1,e2,e3
V = BN −Np(e1)[L+ cpθ(e2) + c+ ch(e3)(1− θ(e2))]−
− [φ1(e1) + φ2(e2) + φ3(e3)]. (3)
The effort in the referral function can be interpreted as actions to improve com-
munication between hospital specialists and primary care center general practition-
ers, as well as actual behavior of both GPs and specialists. A good example is the
use of telemedicine (Harrison, Clayton and Wallace (1996) and Mair and Whit-
ten (2000)), and the development of electronic networks involving primary care
(Willmot and Sullivan (2000)).
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We aim at comparing the net revenue-maximizing efforts of the primary care center
and the hospital under two different management regimes, namely a decentralized
(independent) management and a centralized (joint) management. To do it, we
propose a series of examples defined by particular combinations of reimbursements
schemes.
3.1 Independent management of primary care center and hospital.
Primary care center. From (1) we derive the first order conditions. They are,
∂ΠP
∂e1
=W 1(e1, ·)−Np′(e1)[cpθ(e2) + c]− φ′1(e1) = 0, (4)
∂ΠP
∂e2
=W 2(e2, ·)−Np(e1)cpθ′(e2)− φ′2(e2) = 0. (5)
As usual, these conditions equate the marginal cost of the respective efforts to
the marginal revenues of the primary care center.
Hospital. From (2) the first order condition is,
∂ΠH
∂e3
= R3(e3, ·)−Np(e1)c′h(e3)[1− θ(e2)]− φ
′
3(e3) = 0. (6)
As usual, this condition equates the marginal cost of the effort to the marginal
revenue of the hospital.
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3.2 Joint management of primary care center and hospital.
Under joint management of the primary care center and the hospital, the selection
of efforts are derived from the following objective function,
Π = max
e1,e2,e3
W (e1, e2) +R(e1, e2, e3)
− [φ1(e1) + φ2(e2) + φ3(e3)]
−Np(e1)[cpθ(e2) + c+ ch(e3)(1− θ(e2))]
Accordingly, the system of first order conditions is,
W 1(e1, ·) +R1(e1, ·)−Np′(e1) [cpθ(e2) + c+ ch(e3) (1− θ(e2))]
− φ′1(e1) = 0, (7)
W 2(e2, ·) +R2(e2, ·)−Np(e1)θ′(e2)[cp − ch(e3)]− φ′2(e2) = 0, (8)
R3(e3, ·)−Np(e1)c′h(e3)[1− θ(e2)]− φ
′
3(e3) = 0. (9)
3.3 Social Welfare.
The problem to solve from the social welfare point of view is to find a vector of
effort to maximize the function given by (3).
The set of first order conditions is,
−Np′(e1)[cpθ(e2) + c+ ch(e3)(1− θ(e2)) + L]− φ′1(e1) = 0, (10)
−Np(e1)θ′(e2)[cp − ch(e3)]− φ′2(e2) = 0, (11)
−Np(e1)c′h(e3)[1− θ(e2)]− φ
′
3(e3) = 0. (12)
3.4 Joint management, independent management and welfare.
Let β and γ be parameters to allow the comparison of the joint and independent
management for the different efforts. Let also α and δ be parameters allowing this
comparison w.r.t. social welfare.
Looking now at the first order conditions (4), (7), (10) we can summarize them
11
as,
φ
′
1(e1) = αW
1(e1, ·) + βR1(e1, ·)
−Np′(e1)[cpθ(e2) + c+ γch(e3)(1− θ(e2)) + δL]. (13)
Note that for α = 1 and β = γ = δ = 0 we recover (4); for δ = 0 and
α = β = γ = 1 we recover (7). Also for γ = δ = 1 and α = β = 0 we recover
(10).
Regarding effort e2, the first order conditions (5), (8) and (11) can be summa-
rized as,
φ
′
2(e2) = αW
2(e2, ·) + βR2(e2, ·)−Np(e1)θ′(e2)[cp − γch(e3)]. (14)
For α = 1 and β = γ = 0 we recover (5); for α = β = γ = 1 we recover (8).
Finally, for γ = 1 and α = β = 0 we obtain (11).
The first order conditions with respect effort e3 in the independent and joint
management cases coincide. Therefore, we can summarize all the first order con-
ditions as,
φ
′
3(e3) = αR
3(e3, ·)−Np(e1)c′h(e3)[1− θ(e2)], (15)
where α = 1 lets us recover (6) and (9), while for α = 0 we recover (12).
To ease the comparisons between the different scenarios we summarize in Ta-
ble 1 the values of the transition parameters.
Joint Independent Social Welfare
α 1 1 0
β 1 0 0
γ 1 0 1
δ 0 0 1
Table 1: Values of the transition parameters.
3.5 Joint vs. Independent Management
We can now address the following question: what is the effect of moving from
a decentralized organization of primary and acute care to an integrated-services
view, conditional on the proposed payment rules?
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We know, from our normative analysis, that under the assumptions of the
model, the first-best can be achieved under both structures, provided payment
schedules are appropriately defined. Since the optimal rules derived (see section 4
below) are not observed in practice (up to our knowledge), then it is relevant to ask
what are the effort implications of alternative architectures for the health system.
To compare the joint management and the independent management, note that
looking at the two first columns of Table 1, α = 1 and δ = 0. Finally, β = γ
go from 1 to 0 when considering the transition from a joint to an independent
management. Hence, we can do the comparative statics on β.
The system of first order conditions (13)-(15) characterizes the equilibrium
effort levels, that is
φ
′
i(ei) = ki(β), i = 1, 2, 3,
To provide a positive view on the implication of our model, we have to define a
specific payment schedule. Thus, assume the hospital is reimbursed according to a
prospective budget rule, that is, R(e1, e2, e3) = a0. According to Mossialos and Le
Grand (1999) prospective budgets is the most common type of payment of hospital
care (even if the global budget is built on the basis of expected activity).2
3.5.1 Capitation payment for primary care service
Regarding the primary care center, let us assume that it is reimbursed on a capita-
tion basis, that is
W (e1, e2) = b1N + b2Np(e1) + b3Np(e1)cpθ(e2), (16)
where b2 < 1 and b3 < 1 capture per capita value per visit and per treatment.
2See Mossialos and Le Grand (1999) tables 1.4 and 1.5 for an overview of different systems
present in the European Union. This formulation has also been used extensively in the literature.
See, for example, Chalkley and Malcomson (2000).
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Figure 1: Impact of integration on e1 and e2.
Now the system of first order conditions, into account (16), reduces to
k1(β) ≡−Np′(e1)
[
cpθ(e2)(1− b3) + c− b2
+ β(1− θ(e2))ch(e3)
]
(17)
k2(β) ≡−Np(e1)θ′(e2)
[
cp(1− b3)− βch(e3))
]
(18)
k3(β) ≡−Np(e1)c′h(e3))(1− θ(e2)) ≥ 0. (19)
As a first step, note that k1(β = 0) < k1(β = 1) for all e2 and e3, k2(β =
0) < k2(β = 1) for all e1 and e3, and k3(β = 0) = k3(β = 1) for all e1 and e2.
Thus, when changing from β = 0 to β = 1, the curve ki(β = 0), evaluated at the
new effort levels, is a lower bound to the true ki(β = 1), also evaluated at the new
equilibrium effort levels.
To have an interior equilibrium, at all effort levels, it is required that (from (17),
(18), and (19)):
cpθ(e2)(1− b3) + c− b2 + β(1− θ(e2))ch(e3) > 0, (20)
cp(1− b3)− βch(e3) < 0. (21)
Expression (21) does not hold for β = 0 and it is likely to hold for β = 1.
Thus, for β = 0 effort e2 will be at its minimum value. The other expression is
satisfied for all values of β as long as b2 < c. This is a sufficient condition relating
the marginal cost of a visit in the primary care center with its marginal revenue.
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Figure 2: Efforts under prospective payment for hospitals and capitation for
primary care centers.
Holding constant other effort levels, it is easy to check that changing to an
integrated-services model will increase both e1 and e2. Figure 1 illustrates this
argument.
Let us now study how ki(β = 0) shifts when we allow for all efforts to vary.
Straightforward derivations establish that
∂k1
∂e2
= −Np′(e1)θ′(e2)
[
cp(1− b3)− βch(e3)
]
∂k1
∂e3
= −Np′(e1)(1− θ(e2))βc′h(e3) < 0
∂k2
∂e1
= −Np′(e1)θ′(e2)
[
cp(1− b3)− βch(e3)
]
∂k2
∂e3
= Np(e1)θ
′
(e2)βc′h(e3) ≤ 0
∂k3
∂e1
= −Np′(e1)c′h(e3)(1− θ(e2)) ≤ 0
∂k3
∂e2
= Np(e1)θ
′
(e2)c′h(e3) ≤ 0
From (21), we find that ∂k1/∂e2 = ∂k2/∂e1 is negative for β = 1 and positive
for β = 0.
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Therefore, in equilibrium, both e1 and e2 increase with the move from indepen-
dent management to integrated services. It is also the case that e3 decreases. The
intuition runs as follows. With integration, decisions on the effort levels of preven-
tion and of treating patients in primary care take into account the costs of hospital
treatment if a patient reaches that stage. Thus, prevention efforts increase as well
as the effort to treat patients. This, in turn, reduces the incentive to invest in cost
reduction at the hospital level (as less patients reach the hospital). Since a lower
effort for cost reduction leads to higher unit hospital costs, it reinforces the incen-
tive to have higher efforts at the primary care level, ensuring internal consistency
of the comparative statics exercise. Figure 2 illustrates this discussion.
We summarize this discussion, in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Under a prospective payment rule for hospital care and capitation
for primary care services, in equilibrium both e1 and e2 efforts increase and e3
decreases when moving from independent management to integrated services.
In other words, lemma 1 says that the change in the management structure of
the two providers of preventive health care services induces an increased effort to
diminish the population of patients and also as many of those patients as possible
are treated at the primary care center. Consistently with this induced behavior on
the part of the primary care center, the hospital faces a lower incentive to control
its treatment costs.
3.5.2 Fee-for-service payment for primary care service
Consider again the payment schedule for the primary care center given by 16. For
treatments paid under fee-for-service, one would expect that marginal benefit to
the provider must exceed its marginal cost. Thus, b3 > 1. As in the previous case,
k1(0) < k1(1) and k2(0) < k2(1). Accordingly, when changing from β = 0 to
β = 1, the curve ki(0), evaluated at the new effort levels, is a lower bound to the
true ki(1).
To have interior solutions, we need as before k1(β) > 0 and k2(β) < 0. Now,
the latter expression always holds while the former will generally not hold for
16
β = 0 and effort e1 will be at its minimum, and may hold for β = 1.
Now when we consider a simultaneous variation of e1 and e2 we find that,
∂k1/∂e2 = ∂k2/∂e1 < 0 for all values of β.
Given the properties of this case, it is not possible to predict the final outcome
of the change to integrated services. In a first moment, both e1 and e2 increase.
This triggers a decrease in e3, but also a decrease in e2 and a further increase in e1.
However, due to cross-effects, there are conflicting forces affecting effort levels. In
particular, given that b3 > 1, there is always advantage to the primary care center
in treating the patient. If integration increases the prevention effort, it also means
that the net benefit from treating people at the primary care level will be smaller,
as there is a smaller probability that someone will need treatment. Thus, incentives
to increase the probability of treatment in primary care are smaller. All in all, the
composite effect is ambiguous, a` priori.
This means that integration in health systems that pay primary care providers
on a fee-for-service basis may lead to quite distinct, and to a certain extent unex-
pected, outcomes.
3.6 Hospitals under cost reimbursement
Consider now the other limiting case, that is, full cost reimbursement where
R(e1, e2, e3) = Np(e1)ch(e3)[1 − θ(e2)]. It is straightforward to see that there
is no incentive to perform hospital cost-reduction effort (a well-known result). In
addition, whether we have fee-for-service in primary care (b3 > 1) or a (partial)
prospective system (b3 < 1) is again crucial.
Under a prospective payment system to primary care, even if it is a partial one,
no effort to reduce referral rates is done by both the hospital and the primary care
center. Prevention effort, if done at all, is insensitive to the organizational design.
The intuition runs as follows. Under a partial capitation, it is always profitable
to the primary care center to divert patients to the hospital. Furthermore, as the
latter is fully reimbursed of its costs, it has no incentive to do effort to avoid such
referrals. Therefore, these efforts are at a minimum level.
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Consider in turn the fee-for-service system, b3 > 1. Under this condition,
c − b2 must be sufficiently high for prevention effort to be done at positive levels.
Whenever prevention effort is above its minimum level, integration increases pre-
vention and decreases the incentive for referral rate reductions. Again, the full-cost
reimbursement effect is at work. There is no cost in shifting patients to the hospital
There is only the financial loss of not treating them at the primary care center.3
The last subcase occurs when prevention is not sufficiently rewarded, and e1
is set at its minimum value. Under fee-for-service, integration leads the hospital
management to recognize the financial gain associated with treating patients at the
primary care level. Thus, both referral rates efforts will increase, as the marginal
value of effort done at the primary care center is increasing in the level of effort
done at the hospital.
We find again that optimal efforts will evolve in different directions, after inte-
gration of primary care and hospital management, depending on the way treatment
at primary care centers is paid. It is not generally true that integration promotes
less referrals to hospitals. It is more likely to be so, under cost reimbursement as
the main financing environment for hospitals, whenever primary care treatments
are paid under fee-for-service (price above marginal cost of treatment).
3.7 Absence of prevention effort
Our analysis illustrates that vertical integration of different layers of provision in
the health care market and prevention issues cannot be seen in isolation. The eco-
nomic incentives are interdependent in a non-obvious way. To make the point clear,
suppose that prevention effort done by the primary care center is constant. Then,
the relevant first-order conditions are:
k2(β) =−Np(e¯1)θ′(e2)[cp(1− b3)− βch(e3)]
k3(β) =−Np(e¯1)c′h(e3)(1− θ(e2)) ≥ 0
3This can be verified analytically by total differentiation of first-order conditions and computation
of comparative statics effects. To sign expressions, one appeals to second-order sufficient conditions:
principal minors alternate in sign, starting negative, for a maximum value of the objective function
to be achieved.
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Totally differentiating with respect to e2, e3 and β allows to establish that:
de2
dβ
> 0 and de3
dβ
< 0 (22)
(without any ambiguity, as we assumed a2 = 0). Thus, in the absence of preven-
tion, the move from independent to joint management leads to an increase in efforts
to avoid referrals (consequently, the primary care center treats more patients) and
a decrease in hospital cost-reduction effort (as fewer patients reach the hospital
and higher hospital costs reinforce the incentive to treat at primary care whenever
feasible).
When prevention effort (and incentives) is accounted for and treatments at pri-
mary care are paid, at the margin, below cost, the same intuition and effects carry
through. However, if treatment at primary care is paid under fee for service, with
“price” above marginal cost (b3 > 1), then comparative statics differ from the case
without prevention. This is so because prevention efforts change both the marginal
benefit of effort to avoid referrals to the hospital and the marginal benefit of hos-
pital cost reductions (decreasing on prevention effort). Any increase in prevention
dampens the incentive to do effort at the primary care center to avoid referral to
hospital, as described above. Thus, incentives for cost reduction, for prevention
and payments systems/providers organization interact in complex ways. They can-
not be treated in a simple additive way.
4 Implementing the first best allocation of efforts
Expressions (13) to (15) summarize the difference among the different first order
conditions under independent management, joint management and the social wel-
fare. We now want to study the payment systems under both independent and joint
management allowing to achieve the first best.
We already know that we can characterize these payments systems since no
informational difficulties appear in the model. Nevertheless, we want to assess
the optimality properties (if any) of the reimbursement schedules proposed in the
previous illustrations.
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4.1 Independent management
In terms of efforts e1 and e2 we can implement the first-best efforts if we can design
a reimbursement W (e1, e2, ·) for the primary care center such that
W 1 =−Np′(e1)[ch(e3)(1− θ(e2)) + L], (23)
W 2 =Np(e1)θ
′
(e2)ch(e3). (24)
The reimbursement condition (23) establishes that, on the margin, the system
should reward on the basis of people treated and on the social value of prevention,
while condition (24) sets up a reimbursement component associated with the re-
ferral rate to the hospital. At the margin, the last term equals the change in the
referral rate times the savings from avoiding hospital treatment. That is, the ref-
erence benchmark is not the the cost of treating people in the primary care center
but the cost saving of avoiding their treatment in the hospital (the true economic
opportunity cost of primary care treatment).
Regarding the hospital, effort e3 is set at its optimal level.
4.2 Joint management
In the case of joint management, we can implement the first-best efforts if we can
design reimbursements W (e1, e2, ·) and R(·, e3) for the primary care center and
the hospital respectively such that,
W 1 +R1 =−Np′(e1)L,
W 2 +R2 =0,
R3 =0.
Under joint management, there is internalization of efforts affecting referral
rates, allowing for a full prospective payment of the hospital part. As to the primary
care center, the payment system only needs to correct for the marginal social value
of prevention.
Under adequate mixed payment rules, the first-best allocation of resources is
achieved under both system architectures. This is not surprising given the full
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information context of the model.
5 Conclusions
A main finding of our analysis is that due to internalization of referral rate impact
of hospital and primary care center efforts, under joint management the payment
rules are considerably simpler than under independent management. This consti-
tutes an argument for joint management, as it is being attempted in the Portuguese
NHS, with the creation of the ”local health systems”. However, the full prospective
payment envisaged for such health entities is not optimal, according to our analy-
sis. The reason is that a fully prospective payment for the joint management still
entails too few incentives for prevention efforts. Thus, the payment rule must be
such that the private marginal benefit of prevention equals the social one.
Of course, under the independent management architecture, the payment rule
must also align the incentives for efforts that decrease referral rates. These ad-
justments are somewhat involved, as different referral rates also lead to different
incentives efforts for prevention (by the primary care center) and cost reduction (by
the hospital). Still, in either case, the variables to be included in the payment rules
are in general observed, or can be presumably estimated from existing data (this is
the case of referral rates behavior and of the probability of being sick).
Although a full discussion of implementation issues is beyond the scope of
the paper, some comments on it are deserved. The major difficulties are (a) the
definition of p′(e1) – the marginal effect of prevention effort, and (b) θ′(e2) – the
marginal effects upon the referral rate.
The joint management case faces only problem (a), as it internalizes completely
in the decision-making process of the health entity all the relevant marginal im-
pacts.
To define p′(e1) there are, basically, two options. One is to econometrically
estimate it. The second one is to approximate it by a linear function, which can be
specified on the basis of actual visits to the primary care center and on expected
number of visits. This expected number of visits can be set in a variety of ways
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(value of last year, mean value from a sample, adjusted for covered population
differences in characteristics, etc.). It is also worthwhile pointing out that the pay-
ment rule can be applied either in the case of “captive population” of the primary
care center (that is, whenever the primary care center cannot dump patients to other
primary care centers), or in the case of competition among primary care centers,
in which case dumping of patients could be a concern. In the latter situation, the
expected number of patients must be based on the population enrolled at that pri-
mary care center and not on the population of the (presumed) geographical area
of influence. Naturally, other elements may dictate the choice of one architecture
over the other.
In this paper we have identified a different motive to set a mixed reimburse-
ment system, which has a simple interpretation in our context. Moreover, unlike
other motives, the calibration of the weight parameters is prone to be measured.
This is in sharp contrast to other motives presented in the economics literature:
(i) the asymmetric information motive (Laffont and Tirole (1993)) requires knowl-
edge of the managers utility function for effort; (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity
motive (Pope (1990)) demands information on patient factors that drive health care
costs; (iii) the agency motive (Ellis and McGuire (1986)) requires knowledge of the
physicians utility function; (iv) the measurement error motive (Newhouse (1991))
needs information on error variance of the prices.
The driving force behind our results is the referral externality. This makes our
analysis complementary to most works reported in the literature. It also addresses
in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.
Our analysis is based on a very simple model that abstracts from many other
issues. Thus, for a complete view of actual payment systems and for a more
complete discussion of organizational design (integrated services vs. independent
providers), one must add other relevant aspects, treated in the literature. We con-
jecture, nonetheless, that the externality effect highlighted here will remain. More-
over, the type of payment system required to internalize the referral externality is
likely to survive in more complex settings.
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